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The Constitutional Court recently declared the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment 
Act 2007 (Act 32 of 2007) unconstitutional in its requirement that the names of child offenders be automatically 
included on the National Register for Sex Offenders when convicted of a sexual offence against a child or a 
person with disability. The Court held that automatic inclusion on the Register violated a child’s right in terms 
of section 28(2) to have their best interests taken into account as the paramount consideration in every matter 
affecting the child. The Court held that the individual circumstances of children should be taken into account 
and that they should be given the opportunity to be heard by the sentencing court regarding the placement of 
their details on the Register. The Court decided that sentencing courts should be given the discretion to decide 
whether to place a child on the Register or not.      
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The past few years have seen significant 
developments in the laws that determine how the 
criminal justice system interacts with child offenders. 
Greater emphasis is placed on practices such as 
diverting child offenders from the criminal justice 
system; applying restorative justice principles to 
child offenders while ensuring their responsibility and 
accountability for crimes committed; and effectively 
rehabilitating and reintegrating child offenders to 
minimise the potential of reoffending.1 This has 
resulted in increased dialogue and a proliferation 
of judgements2 that aim to provide guidance on 
the implementation of legislation regulating this 
interaction. Courts have engaged and grappled with 
the law, and issues that arise from the law, in light of 
the Constitution and international law. 
The recent Constitutional Court judgement of 
J v National Director of Public Prosecutions and 
Another3 is no exception, with its main focus being 
the constitutionality of automatically placing child 
offenders on the National Register for Sex Offenders 
(the Register) after conviction. (The Register and its 
purpose are discussed in more detail below in the 
section ‘Overview of the legal provisions at issue’.)
Brief background 
When the applicant (J) was 14 years old, he 
was charged with the rape of three minors in 
contravention of section 3 of the Criminal Law 
(Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment 
Act 2007 (Act 32 of 2007, the Sexual Offences 
Act). In addition, he was charged with assault with 
intent to cause grievous bodily harm after stabbing a 
12-year-old girl. He pleaded guilty to all the charges 
and was convicted by a Child Justice Court. J was 
sentenced to five years’ compulsory residence in 
a child and youth care centre and a further three 
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years’ imprisonment thereafter for the three rape 
charges.4 For the assault charge he was given a 
suspended sentence of six months’ imprisonment.5 
The magistrate also ordered that J’s name be entered 
on the Register in terms of section 50(2) of the Sexual 
Offences Act.6 Section 50(2) states the following:
(a) A court that has in terms of this Act or any  
 other law—
(i)  convicted a person of a sexual offence 
against a child or a person who is 
mentally disabled and, after sentence 
has been imposed by that court for such 
offence, in the presence of the convicted 
person; or
(ii)  made a finding and given a direction in 
terms of section 77(6) or 78(6) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, that 
the person is by reason of mental 
illness or mental defect not capable of 
understanding the proceedings so as to 
make a proper defence or was, by reason 
of mental illness or mental defect, not 
criminally responsible for the act which 
constituted a sexual offence against 
a child or a person who is mentally 
disabled, in the presence of that person,
must make an order that the particulars of 
the person be included in the Register.
(b) When making an order contemplated in 
paragraph (a), the court must explain the 
contents and implications of such an order, 
including section 45, to the person in 
question.7 
The matter went before the Western Cape High 
Court by way of automatic review in terms of section 
85(1)(a) of the Child Justice Act.8 The High Court 
mero motu [of its own accord] asked the regional 
magistrate and the Director of Public Prosecutions 
whether the magistrate was competent to make an 
order in terms of section 50(2) of the Sexual Offences 
Act, in light of the objectives of the Child Justice 
Act as well as section 28 of the Constitution. Both 
responded in the affirmative and recommended 
that the High Court confirm it.9 A full bench was 
constituted to hear the matter on 3 May 2013. J was 
represented by Legal Aid, and the Centre for Child 
Law, upon the invitation of the Court, entered the 
matter as amicus curiae.10 
Deliberations in the high court
It was argued on J’s behalf that regional magistrates 
are granted no discretion by section 50(2) to decline 
to make an order to place child offenders’ details 
on the Register, as the Act does not distinguish 
between a child sexual offender and an adult sexual 
offender.11  The automatic inclusion of their details 
on the Register ignores the rights of child offenders, 
such as the right to be protected against degradation 
and the right not to have his or her well-being, moral 
or social development placed at risk.12 Inclusion, it 
was argued, fails to consider the long-term effects on 
the child offender and is not in line with the objectives 
and principles of the Child Justice Act, which places 
child offenders in a different category from adult 
offenders and recognises their unique and vulnerable 
position in society.13  
The amicus curiae agreed that section 50(2) violates a 
number of the constitutional rights of child offenders, 
and undermines the objectives of the Register.14 It 
argued that the section is not properly in touch with 
the aim of the Register, which is to protect children 
and persons with disabilities from predatory adults by 
limiting their employment opportunities to jobs that 
do not involve access to children or persons with 
mental disabilities.15 The amicus further pointed out 
that the section is too broad, particularly as a result 
of the comprehensive definition of sexual assault, 
which includes everything from rape to kissing.16 The 
amicus submitted that the section cannot be read 
in a constitutionally compliant manner, and therefore 
amounts to a constitutional infringement of rights.17  
The state argued that placing offenders’ details on 
the Register is not an infringement of their inherent 
dignity.18 The contents of the Register are not made 
public; only certain categories of people can access 
the contents of the Register through an application 
process.19 The section gives judicial officers the 
power to order that the name of a sexual offender, 
including a child sexual offender, be included in the 
Register with the aim of eradicating the high number 
of sexual offences in South Africa.20  
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On considering the arguments by all the parties, the 
High Court found that the rights of child offenders as 
well as those of adult offenders would be infringed 
by section 50(2) of the Sexual Offences Act because 
of the consequences and the impact of inclusion of 
their details on the Register, and mainly because it 
affected their right to be heard.21   
On the question of whether the infringement of 
these rights was justifiable in terms of section 36 of 
the Constitution, the High Court held that because 
the legitimate constitutional purpose of the Sexual 
Offences Act is to protect victims of sexual abuse, 
the limitation of the rights of the offenders was 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society.22 It further found that in the case of child 
offenders, the best interests set out in section 28(2) of 
the Constitution may be limited.23 
The High Court was, however, of the view that 
section 50(2) prevents a court from assessing child 
offenders to determine if they pose any threat to 
others and if circumstances warrant their inclusion on 
the Register.24 This is due to the fact that the Sexual 
Offences Act criminalises a broad array of conduct, 
and the presiding officer making the decision to place 
a child on the Register is granted no discretion in the 
matter.25  
Interestingly, on the issue of the right of adult 
offenders to be heard, the High Court held that 
section 50(2) of the Sexual Offences Act infringes 
on their right to a fair hearing as set out in section 
34 of the Constitution.26 The section does not give 
the offender an opportunity to persuade the court 
that he should not be placed on the Register.27 The 
High Court found this infringement to be unjustifiable, 
as no legitimate constitutional purpose is served.28  
It therefore found section 50(2) of the Sexual 
Offences Act to be invalid and inconsistent with the 
Constitution.29  
The declaration of constitutional inconsistency was 
suspended for 18 months to afford the legislature 
the opportunity to amend the section.30 Through the 
process of ‘reading in’, the Court inserted words 
into section 50(2) that would be applied during the 
18-month suspension. The intent of the insertion 
was that, if good cause was shown, a court could 
direct that an offender’s details not be included in 
the Register.31 Furthermore, courts would have the 
responsibility to inform convicted persons that they 
could make representations on their inclusion in the 
Register.32   
Deliberations in the 
Constitutional Court 
Section 172(2)(a) of the Constitution requires an 
order of constitutional invalidity to be confirmed by 
the Constitutional Court before coming into force. 
On 6 February 2014 the Constitutional Court heard 
arguments and dealt with the issues below:33  
•	 Should	the	proceedings	extend	to	adult	offenders?	
•	 Does	section	50(2)	of	the	Sexual	Offences	Act	limit	
constitutional rights and, if so, can the limitation be 
justified in terms of section 36 of the Constitution?
•	 If	the	limitation	cannot	be	justified,	the	section	must	
be declared unconstitutional and the Constitutional 
Court must determine a just and equitable remedy. 
Overview of the legal provisions 
at issue
Chapter 6 of the Sexual Offences Act provides for the 
establishment of the Register to contain particulars 
of persons convicted of any sexual offence against 
a child or a person with a mental disability.34 The 
Register aims to protect children and persons with 
mental disabilities from coming into contact with 
sex offenders by ensuring that relevant employers, 
licensing authorities and childcare authorities are 
informed that a particular person is on the Register.35  
A prospective employer must apply with the Registrar 
to check the prospective employee’s details against 
the Register.36  
Once a person’s details are on the Register, section 
41(1) of the Sexual Offences Act provides that they 
cannot be employed to work with children; hold any 
position that places them in a position of authority, 
supervision or care of children; be granted a licence 
or approval to manage or operate an entity, business 
or trade in relation to the supervision or care of 
children or where children are present; and become 
foster parents, kinship caregivers, temporary safe 
caregivers or adoptive parents.37      
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An offender has an obligation to disclose any 
previous sexual offences against children or persons 
with mental disabilities to an employer, licensing 
authority or childcare authority. Failing to do this will 
result in criminal sanction.38  
Once an offender’s details have been entered 
on the Register they can only be removed under 
limited circumstances.39 Section 51(2) lays out two 
circumstances in which a person’s details may never 
be removed, namely when someone has been 
sentenced to a period of imprisonment of over 18 
months (even if wholly suspended), or if a person has 
two or more convictions of a sexual offence against a 
child or persons with mental disabilities.40 
A plain reading of section 50 of the Sexual Offences 
Act points to the registration applying to child 
offenders.41 Section 50(2)(a) applies to ‘a person 
[convicted] of a sexual offence against a child or a 
person who is mentally disabled’, where ‘person’ 
applies to both children and adults.42 
The scope of the proceedings
When the matter was before the High Court, the main 
issue before it, and the questions raised, focused on 
child offenders.43 The Court, however, made an order 
that deliberately extended to adult offenders, while 
making no distinction between child offenders and 
adult offenders.44 
The Constitutional Court did not approve of this 
approach and was of the view that ‘[w]hile courts are 
empowered to raise constitutional issues of their own 
accord, this power is not boundless.45 In order for 
the interests of justice to favour a court considering a 
constitutional issue of its own accord, it is important 
that the issue arises on the facts because it is 
generally undesirable to deal with an issue in 
abstract …’46  
The facts presented before the High Court raised the 
application of section 50(2) to child offenders.47 The 
Constitutional Court held that it was inappropriate 
for the High Court to consider the constitutionality 
of the section in relation to adult offenders and 
then to extend its order to cover all offenders.48 The 
issues raised by the case would apply differently to 
children and adults, and they had not been discussed 
properly on the facts or in legal argument in the High 
Court or the Constitutional Court.49 
Does section 50(2)(a) infringe on the 
rights of the child offender?
The Court confirmed that the starting point for 
matters concerning the child is section 28(2) of the 
Constitution, which provides that: 
A child’s best interests are of paramount 
importance in every matter concerning 
the child.50
The best-interests principle: 
... encapsulates the idea that the child is a 
developing being, capable of change and in 
need of appropriate nurturing to enable her to 
determine herself to the fullest extent and to 
develop her moral compass. [The Constitutional 
Court] has emphasised the developmental 
impetus of the best-interests principle in 
securing children’s right to learn as they grow 
how they should conduct themselves and 
make choices in the wide and moral world of 
adulthood. In the context of criminal justice, the 
Child Justice Act affirms the moral malleability or 
reformability of the child offender.51   
The Court laid out key principles for applying the best 
interests approach to child offenders:52 
•	 The	law	should	generally	distinguish	between	
adults and children
•	 The	law	must	allow	for	an	individuated	approach	to	
child offenders
•	 The	child	or	their	legal	representative	must	be	
afforded an appropriate and adequate opportunity 
to make representations at every stage of the 
criminal justice process, giving due weight to the 
age and maturity of the child
The Court discussed the three principles and found 
that in relation to the first principle, section 50(2) 
in its current form does not distinguish between 
adult offenders and child offenders.53 Furthermore, 
in relation to the second principle, the Court was 
of the view that the best interests approach should 
be flexible enough to allow for the determination 
of factors that will secure the best interests of 
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the child offender, taking into account individual 
circumstances.54 The Child Justice Act was held 
up as an example to follow, as it provides for an 
individualised approach and contains guiding 
principles to be taken into account when dealing with 
children in the criminal justice system.55    
With regard to the third principle, the Court also 
referred to the Child Justice Act, which provides in its 
guiding principles that every child should be given an 
opportunity to participate in proceedings that would 
result in decisions that affect him or her.56  
When section 50 of the Sexual Offences Act is read 
as a whole, it can be seen that a court is granted no 
discretion on whether or not to include an offender’s 
details on the Register.57 The registration occurs 
automatically after conviction and sentencing, or 
after the court has made a finding in terms of section 
77(6) or 78(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act.58 This 
is an infringement of the best interests of the child.59  
The requirement for automatic registration excludes 
an opportunity for individual responses to the child 
offender, as well as the opportunity to take into 
account the views and representation of the child.60  
The restricted conditions under which an offender 
can apply for his or her details to be removed from 
the Register are not flexible enough to consider the 
particular child’s development, or ability to reform.61  
The consequences that arise from being placed on 
the Register will not only affect the child offender 
while still a child, but may extend into adulthood.62  
Child offenders who have served their sentences but 
whose details have been included on the Register 
‘will remain tarred with the sanction of exclusion from 
areas of life and livelihood that may be formative 
of their personal dignity, family life, and ability to 
pursue a living’.63 This seriously affects the rights of 
the children concerned, as they may still be able to 
benefit from rehabilitation services and be integrated 
into society if given the opportunity and necessary 
tools.64 
Is the limitation of the right of the child 
offender justifiable?
The right of child offenders to have their best interests 
considered paramount, as set out in section 28(2) 
of the Constitution, can be subject to limitation.65 
Section 36 of the Constitution states that rights 
can be limited to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom, and sets out the following factors to be 
taken into account:
•	 The	nature	of	the	right
•	 The	importance	of	the	purpose	of	the	limitation
•	 The	nature	and	extent	of	the	limitation
•	 The	relation	between	the	limitation	and	its	purpose	
•	 Less	restrictive	means	to	achieve	the	purpose66 
The Court began by acknowledging that, when 
dealing with children exposed to the criminal justice 
system, the importance of the best-interest principle 
cannot be denied.67 It then went on to recognise 
that the Register has a commendable and legitimate 
aim, to keep children and persons with disabilities 
safe in the places where they learn and grow.68 It 
acknowledged the harm caused by sexual violence:  
it ‘threatens a victim’s rights to freedom and security 
of the person, privacy and dignity in a profound way. 
Sexual offences have effects that ripple far beyond 
the horrific immediacy and physicality of the crime.’69  
The limitation therefore aims to achieve a valuable 
purpose, which is to protect children and persons 
with mental disabilities.70 However, the automatic 
operation of section 50(2)(a) results in the limitation 
not always achieving its purpose for child offenders.71  
The Register functions on the premise that the 
offenders concerned pose a risk to children and 
persons with mental disabilities, and disregards the 
fact that patterns of recidivism for sexual offences 
vary considerably between adults and children.72 
The Court was of the view that there are less 
restrictive means to achieve the aims of the 
Register.73 If the courts are granted discretion, and 
the child offender granted an opportunity to make 
representations on the issue of registration, there 
would be the possibility of greater congruence 
between the limitation and its purpose.74 This would 
also provide courts with more flexibility to respond to 
cases on individual merits so as to meet the child’s 
best interests.75 
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The Court concluded that the limitation of the right of 
child offenders in section 50(2)(a) is not justified in an 
open and democratic society, which resulted in the 
section being declared constitutionally invalid.76  
Remedy 
The Court held that the legislature must be afforded 
the opportunity to fix the constitutional defect while 
taking into account expert opinion on the unique 
circumstances of child sex offenders and victims in 
South Africa.77  
The Court, however, found that it was faced with 
difficulties that arose as a consequence of having to 
determine what just and equitable order to grant in 
the interim, namely:78 
•	 The	Sexual	Offences	Act	creates	complex	
mechanisms that regulate the treatment of 
offenders following their convictions. Only section 
50(2)(a) was before the Court. The Court cannot 
order an interim remedy without affecting the rest 
of the statutory scheme.
•	 The	Register	fulfils	an	important	purpose	of	
protecting vulnerable persons from sexual abuse in 
places where they should be safe, and no evidence 
was placed before the Court that children and/
or persons with mental disabilities would not be 
harmed. Therefore it could not issue a moratorium 
on the registration of child offenders or allow the 
declaration to operate retrospectively.
The Constitutional Court therefore instructed 
Parliament to remedy the defect within 15 months, 
during which the declaration would be suspended.79 
However, it advised that a shorter period of correction 
of the defect be preferred, as rights infringements to 
child offenders would continue to operate as a result 
of the suspension of the declaration.80  
With regard to child offenders who have already 
been placed on the Register, the Court ordered 
that a mechanism be provided to identify them so 
that they have an opportunity to obtain legal advice 
and assistance.81 This should be done in order to 
salvage the rights of these children.82 The Court 
will then make the information available to persons 
and organisations seeking to assist these child 
offenders.83 
Analysis and conclusion
This judgement contributes positively to the 
developing jurisprudence that promotes the principle 
that the best interests of children must be considered 
central in matters concerning them. It builds on 
other Constitutional Court judgements that target 
and develop the application of the best interests of 
child offenders (among the often conflicting interests 
of victims and the community).84 It confirms the 
view that children, child offenders in particular, are 
to be regarded as individuals whose cases must 
be decided on their own merits and in light of their 
own individual circumstances. The Court recognises 
the severity of placing child offenders’ details on 
the Register. Such inclusion does not create or 
encourage a growth space in which a child can be 
influenced in positive ways through various means 
that allow for rehabilitation, reform and reintegration. 
Child offenders are thus not merely abandoned to the 
criminal justice system without the consideration of 
less restrictive alternatives.
The rights and interests of victims are not ignored 
by the Court either. The Court successfully strikes 
a balance between the rights and interests of child 
offenders and those of victims. It recognises and 
acknowledges the harm caused by sexual violence 
to the victim, as well as to society. It emphasises 
the importance of protecting vulnerable members of 
society from sexual abuse. There is an appreciation 
of the fact that the Register fulfils the important role 
of protecting victims of sexual abuse, and therefore 
does not completely do away with the possibility of 
including child offenders on the Register. Instead, it 
advocates for granting sentencing courts a discretion 
that is dependent on the circumstances in individual 
cases.      
This said, there are concerns that arise from the 
order that was given by the Court. The first relate 
to the remedies that are available, if any, for child 
offenders whose details have already been included 
on the Register. Once they have been identified, 
questions arise about whether they should be subject 
to individual assessments, who would carry out 
these assessments, and against what criteria. Also, 
even when they have received the required legal 
assistance, and the courts have been convinced that 
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some children should not be on the Register, there 
is no legal standing on which these courts or the 
Registrar can effect the removal of their details from 
the Register. The declaration of invalidity has been 
suspended, leaving the provisions in place, and no 
interim measures have been put in place to assist 
these children.
Lastly, it is a pity that the Court failed to set out a 
structured order that would address the issue of what 
should be done about child offenders who, during 
the 15 months of the suspension of the declaration of 
invalidity, are convicted of and sentenced for sexual 
offences and are therefore automatically placed on 
the Register.   
It is hoped, however, that in the interim, the continued 
implementation of this judgement will result firstly 
in the amendment of the offending legislation and 
provisions therein, and secondly in the protection of 
the best interests of child offenders.
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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